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When interest rates change, interest rate options dealers buy or sell securities to adjust 
the hedging positions that they have taken in order to offset their options exposures. 
The net result of this trading activity, which is unrelated to economic fundamentals, 
can be to push interest rates further in the direction they were moving. Such 
“feedback” effects interfere with the short-term dynamics of interest rate movements 
and can alter the shape of the yield curve, especially when changes in interest rates are 
large. Our empirical results confirm the existence of a positive feedback from the 
activity in the euro-denominated interest rate options market to the european yield 
curve. This finding can be useful for risk management purposes but also for analysts 
and policy makers when interpreting short-run movements in the yield curve as signals 
of future economic activity. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper focuses on a certain aspect of the interest rate options market in 
Europe. More precisely, it looks into the possible consequences from the hedging of 
positions by interest rate options dealers on medium term spot interest rates. The 
effect that the paper seeks to identify may be produced when the option dealers use 
dynamic hedging in order to maintain a so-called “delta neutral” position. Such 
adjustments in positions involve a pattern of buying (selling) the underlying security 
after its price has increased (fallen) which may finally result in a positive feedback to 
the price of the underlying security. In other words, the transactions realised on behalf 
of the options dealers in order to maintain a “delta neutral” position may result in 
further upward (downward) pressure on spot interest rates after an initial upward 
(downward) shock to rates has occurred, for example, following a monetary policy-
induced change in intervention rates. Hull (1993) provides comprehensive 
information on the pricing and hedging of interest rate options. It should be noticed 
that the effect under investigation is implemented in a purely mechanistic way, i.e. it 
is unrelated to expectations of market participants about the future level of interest 
rates. 
Kambhu and Mosser (2001) have studied the positive feedback effect from the 
dollar-denominated options market on the American yield curve. We, too, conduct an 
analysis, similar in spirit, that seeks to verify a positive feedback effect from the euro-
denominated options market on the European yield curve. In fact, the data set we 
employ derives from the German markets. Furthermore, our findings can be 
interestingly compared to those of Kambhu and Mosser. 
The article is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the 
interest rate options market in terms of transaction volumes and the different 
tendencies observed. Section 3 looks into the details of dynamic hedging and the way 
it may be implemented. The model is described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the 
data sets used while Section 6 the estimation results. The study concludes with 
Section 7 where certain policy implications are also put forward. Additional details 
regarding the estimation procedure in terms of econometric tests and results are 
included in the Appendix. 
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2. The interest rate options market 
The bulk of interest rate options are traded over-the-counter (OTC). They are 
mainly caps and floors but also swaptions. An interest rate option/warrant is an option 
contract that gives the right to pay or receive a specific interest rate on a 
predetermined principal for a set period of time. An interest rate cap (floor) is an 
option that pays the difference between a floating interest rate and the cap (floor) rate. 
A cap (or floor) is considered by both theorists and practitioners, and consequently 
treated for pricing and hedging purposes, as a portfolio of interest rate options. More 
specifically, a cap (floor) is treated as a string of call (put) options on the future 
values of the reference interest rate over the contract period. An interest rate swaption 
is an option to enter into an interest rate swap contract, purchasing the right to pay or 
receive a certain fixed rate. Swaptions, as instruments to relocate interest rate risk, 
are, to a significant extent, similar to caps (or floors). 
  Caps and floors are options on future short-term interest rates, usually six-
month Libor - now Euribor - rates. In an interest rate cap (floor) contract, the buyer 
receives the difference between the Euribor rate prevailing at the time and the strike 
rate specified in the options contract when the reference rate is above (below) the 
strike rate, and nothing otherwise. Most cap and floor contracts are written for several 
years. The contract may cover the entire yield curve, up to ten years. 
According to the most recent Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data 
(BIS, 2002), the size of the euro-denominated OTC interest rate derivatives market, in 
terms of daily turnover, is USD 231.5 billion. Almost two thirds of this is attributed 
to interest rate swap activity. Daily turnover in interest rate options amounts to USD 
10.8 billion, which is only slightly below the corresponding figure (USD 12.2 billion) 
for the US dollar-denominated market for similar instruments. This fact reveals the 
comparable size of the two markets. Table 1 shows the evolution of positions in the 
global derivatives market by type of instrument. 
The level of the market’s net demand for interest rate options is of particular 
importance to our analysis. Dealers, by quoting two-way prices and being 
permanently present in the market, buy and sell options on a continuous basis. The 
total amount of options sold in excess of the total amount of options purchased is 
defined as the market’s net demand. The BIS survey data reveal that, in the euro-  7  
denominated interest rate options market, dealers sell to customers some 25% more 
options than they purchase. They are therefore absorbing the market’s net demand for 
interest rate options and, since they want to cover themselves for the interest rate risk 
inherent in their net options positions, they act appropriately in order to hedge those 
positions. Indeed, the ability of dealers to trade in a broad range of markets gives 
them the ability to execute hedging transactions faster and at a lower cost than other 
market participants, making them more willing than others to absorb the market’s net 
demand for options. 
Regarding the maturity of the contracts, from Table 2 it is apparent that there 
has been a robust growth in longer-term interest rate contracts (over five years). 
Between 1995 and 2001, the size of relevant positions increased almost fivefold. 
Although the figures shown concern positions globally, it is almost certainly the case 
that there has been a similar evolution in the euro-denominated interest rate 
derivatives positions, and, more precisely, in the interest rate options positions. The 
latter is of significant relevance to our analysis since the increase in the absolute size 
of positions and the lengthening of contract maturity may be factors that strengthen 
the effect that we are attempting to uncover. 
 
 
3. Dynamic hedging 
Hedging is central to the theory of options pricing. Arbitrage valuation 
models, such as that of Black and Scholes (1973), depend on the idea that an option, 
by using the underlying asset, can be perfectly replicated. It is thus possible to create 
a portfolio which hedges absolutely the position in the option. Delta-hedging 
strategies are recipes for replicating the payoff of a complex security by sophisticated 
dynamic trading of simpler securities. Participants in options markets commonly 
apply the kind of delta-hedging strategies implicit in Black and Scholes, at least 
approximately, in order to reduce their risk exposure. 
The implementation of a delta-hedging strategy has two dimensions. First, 
there is the required size of the position in the underlying asset, which, in turn, 
depends upon the option-pricing model adopted. The option’s delta is defined as the 
first partial derivative of the option price with respect to the price of the underlying   8  
asset. It shows the sensitivity of the option price to changes in the price of the 
underlying. The option’s delta also indicates the size of the position in the asset 
required for hedging. The delta varies with the price of the asset and its value lies 
within the interval [0, 1]. Delta’s rate of change is not constant either, being lower for 
delta values close to zero and higher for delta values close to one. 
Since the seminar work of Black and Scholes (1973) and Black (1976), 
several more refined models for option pricing have emerged. Bühler et al (1999) 
offer a review of the various models developed as well as an empirical evaluation of 
the performance of the most popular interest rate options pricing models from the 
perspective of supervising the interest rate risk. In an earlier work, Stapleton and 
Subrahmanyam (1993) offer a transformation of the Black-Scholes formula as a 
simple and practical tool for valuing interest rate options by employing forward rates 
from the yield curve. We use this specification in the model below. Forward rates can 
be created synthetically by appropriately trading zero coupon bonds whose maturities 
straddle the maturity of the forward rate. Caps are priced as the sum of a series of call 
options for successively more distant reset dates. Since we are working on an 
aggregate (market) level, the “correct” hedging of particular positions is not of 
immediate interest to our analysis. The advent, however, of more refined pricing 
models may have had an effect on the functioning of the market in terms of the 
choice of instruments for delta-hedging available in different market segments with 
different liquidity characteristics. 
The second dimension in implementing a delta-hedging strategy is the 
appropriate timing for rebalancing. Much of the theory of options assumes that 
markets are frictionless, a hypothesis that implies the absence of transactions costs. In 
fact, theoretically once an option (short) position is taken, the replicating portfolio is 
created containing delta units (long) of the underlying and, from that time on, it is 
continuously rebalanced in a self-financing manner. Continuous rebalancing means 
that at all times, from the creation of the position until the option’s expiry and as delta 
varies over time, the replicating portfolio contains exactly delta units of the 
underlying asset. 
In practice, rebalancing takes place only at discrete time intervals and the 
reason for that is the existence of transactions costs. The immediate consequence of 
discrete rebalancing is the emergence of the so-called tracking error. In discrete time   9  
and in between two consecutive rebalancings, the value of the replicating portfolio 
may not match exactly the size of the position in the derivative thus leaving this 
position in the interim less than fully hedged. Most importantly, rebalancing has an 
immediate effect on the dealer’s P&L account: as the number of rebalancings 
increases, the cumulated loss due to transactions costs increases as well. Clearly, 
there is a tradeoff between the consequences on P&L and a less accurate hedging 
position or, in other words, between the size of the transactions cost and the degree of 
the dealer’s risk aversion. 
Several articles have been written on the issue of dynamic hedging under 
transactions costs. Clewlow and Hodges (1997) study the problem by maximising the 
trader’s expected utility and then adopting an optimal control approach. One aspect of 
their solution indicates that even if an options book is currently exactly delta-hedged 
under Black-Scholes, taking into account transactions costs, it may nevertheless be 
optimal to move the hedge away from the Black-Scholes value. Bertsimas et al 
(2000) adopt a different approach in dealing with the issue by focusing their analysis 
uniquely on the aspect of the magnitude of the replication error. They derive a 
measure of the tracking error that can be used to infer an option-specific, optimal 
number of rebalancing periods. 
Dynamic hedging in discrete time is directly incorporated into the model we 
adopt for our purposes. In fact, the model is explicitly written in terms of differences 
in the value of each explanatory variable -i.e. the forward rates. The difference is the 
change in the variable’s value over a specific time interval. By investigating which 
difference should be considered as optimal within our model, we get an estimate of 
the general market tendency regarding the time period between rebalancings. 
 
 
4. The model 
Most cap and floor contracts are written for several years. The dealer’s 
exposure to every single (e.g. six-month) forward interest rate may thus span the 
entire yield curve out to ten years. For maturities up to two or three years, dealers 
directly hedge every single forward interest rate exposure. In this time horizon, the 
underling market for forward interest rates has suitable characteristics in terms of   10  
contract availability and sufficient liquidity for this purpose. For maturities, beyond 
three years, however, dealers hedge longer sections of the yield curve in blocks, 
broken at those points where the markets for the underlying securities are most liquid. 
For example, an options dealer may hedge all of the (e.g. six-month) forward rates of 
between three and five years in terms of a single exposure to the three-to-five year 
forward interest rate. Similarly, all the six-month forward rates of between five and 
ten years are hedged in terms of a single exposure to the five-to-ten year forward 
interest rate. 
A position in a forward interest rate is created synthetically by appropriate 
trading of bonds whose maturities straddle the maturity of the forward rate. Taking a 
long position in the five-year bond and a short position in the ten-year bond attains a 
long position in the five-to-ten year forward interest rate
1. Similarly, taking a long 
position in the three-year bond and a short position in the five-year bond attains a 
long position in the three-to-five year forward interest rate. Therefore, hedging of 
exposures to either of these forward rates requires trading in the five-year bond. 
When positions are dynamically (delta-) hedged, they are adjusted at discrete time 
intervals as interest rates change over time. 
We shall attempt to verify the existence of the feedback effect from dynamic 
hedging of options positions on the five-year spot rate by examining how the latter 
reacts to changes in the three-to-five year and five-to-ten year forward rates. Caps are 
hedged by maintaining long positions in the forward rates while floors by maintaining 
short positions in the forward rates. 
An initial steepening of the yield curve
2 will cause forward rates to rise. Long 
positions in the three-to-five and five-to-ten forward interest rates will adjust in the 
following way: long positions in the three-to-five forward rate require further short 
selling of the five year bond, action that exerts downward pressure on the price of the 
bond, translating into an increase in its yield. Long positions in the five-to-ten 
forward rate require additional buying of the five-year bond, action that exerts 
upward pressure on the price of the bond and therefore a downward pressure on the 
its yield. Similar effects on the five-year rate will be produced when adjusting short 
                                                           
1 This position gains money if the forward rate increases. 
2 Flattening, if the curve is inverted.   11  
positions in the three-to-five and five-to-ten year forward rates following an initial 
steepening of the yield curve. 
Table 3 summarises the effects of dynamic hedging adjustments on the five-
year rate. Changes in the three-to-five forward rate will always induce changes in the 
five-year rate in the same direction. By contrast, changes in the five-to-ten forward 
rate will always induce changes in the five-year rate that are in the opposite direction. 
We test for the presence of the described relationship by estimating the 
following equation: 
ε β β β α + − − ∆ + − − ∆ + − − ∆ + − + = ∆ ) , 1 ( ) , 1 ( ) , 1 ( ) 1 ( 5 3 10 , 5 2 5 , 3 1 5 t r t F t F Z c r    (1) 
where 
5 r ∆    is the one-week change in the five-year interest rate 
) , 1 ( 5 , 3 t F − − ∆  is  the  t-1 week change in the three-to-five year forward rate, lagged 
one week 
) , 1 ( 10 , 5 t F − − ∆  is  the t-1 week change in the five-to-ten year forward rate, lagged one 
week 
) , 1 ( 5 t r − − ∆  is  the  t-1 week change in the five-year spot rate, lagged one week 
Z (-1)  is the error-correction term from the cointegration relationship in the levels of 
the five-year and forward rates, lagged one week. 
If the positive feedback from dynamic hedging of options positions on the 
five-year rate is verified by our data, the estimated coefficients of the changes in 
forward rates must be statistically significant and have the appropriate signs, that is: 
0 1 > β  and  0 2 < β . In addition, the coefficient α  should have negative sign and be 
statistically significant. The latter guarantees the existence of a long-run equilibrium 




5. The data set 
The purpose of our analysis is to test for the existence of a positive feedback 
effect, due to dynamic hedging, from the euro-denominated options market to the 
European yield curve. We consider the German market as the benchmark market for   12  
the purposes of our analysis. The German OTC market for interest rate options started 
in 1989. Our data set is divided into two subsets, one from the German government 
paper market and the other from the German market for interest rate swaps (IRS) –the 
German IRS market. All data are weekly. 
The sample period for the data from the German government paper market 
ranges from 1991 to 2002. The three, five and ten-year rate series are the respective 
yields from the German government bond yield curve. They were obtained from 
Bloomberg by retrieving the generic-yield series provided which go back as far as 
1991. We have calculated the forward rates from those three, five and ten-year yields 
by employing the usual formula. Diagram 1 shows how the values of five-year yield, 
three-to-five and five-to-ten year forward rates have evolved over the sample period. 
There seems to be a change in behaviour between the pre-1992 period and the rest of 
the period under consideration. The beginning of the nineties was a period of 
particular turbulence for european markets which reached its peak with the ERM 
crisis in September 1992. Thereafter, markets were more convinced about the 
possibilities for the successful accomplishment of EMU and consequently they 
functioned more smoothly. 
The sample period for the German IRS market is from 1990 to 2002. The 
three, five and ten-year swap rate series were also obtained from Bloomberg where 
the series provided go back as far as 1988. From those swap rates, we calculated the 
forward rates necessary for the estimation of our model. Diagram 2 depicts the 
evolution over time of the five-year swap rate and the three-to-five and five-to-ten 
year forward rates. The aforementioned change in behaviour between the pre-1992 
period and the rest of the period under consideration is reconfirmed by the data from 







                                                           
3 The need to restrict the sample was also confirmed by the fact that the cointegrating relationship was 
problematic when we employed full sample data. For the estimation of (1) using the data from the IRS   13  
6. The results 
Equation (1) was estimated in various ways by employing different time 
series. The coefficient  3 β  was never statistically significant in any of the initial 
estimations. We, therefore, dropped the variable  ) , 1 ( 5 t r − − ∆  from (1) and 
concentrated solely on  1 β  and  2 β . Technical details concerning our estimations can 
be found in the Appendix. 
First, we deal with the issue of the appropriate value of t in equation (1), i.e. 
the appropriate time span for calculating the difference in the forward rates. To this 
end, we estimate equation (1) repeatedly for  50 ,..., 4 , 3 , 2 = t  using data from the 
government paper market
4. Diagram 3 presents the statistical significance of the 
relationship between spot and forward rates, as captured by the value of the F-statistic 
of the joint distribution of  1 β  and  2 β , corresponding to various periods of changes in 
forwards, ranging from one to forty-nine weeks. Taking the sixteen-week change in 
forward rates results in the highest statistical significance of the relationship between 
spot and forward rates. As observed in diagram 3, the statistical significance of the 
examined relationship increases progressively for differences from nine to sixteen 
weeks and then weakens, though relatively slowly, becoming insignificant for 
differences higher than forty-three weeks. In addition, diagram 4 shows the 
confidence bands for the estimated coefficients 1 β  and  2 β  corresponding to the 
various differences considered. The confidence bands depict the sign, size and 
statistical significance of the estimated coefficients. The estimated coefficients are 
both statistically significant and have the right sign when considering changes in 
forward rates ranging between nine and seventeen weeks. 
The information contained in our data set, therefore, indicates that, in the 
european market, rebalancing of positions maintained for the purpose of hedging 
interest rate option exposures takes place every four months
5. This finding is 
remarkably different from the relevant period that Kambhu and Mosser (2001) have 
                                                                                                                                                                      
market, the sample period was further reduced to the period 1994 – 2002 in order to obtain a 
satisfactory cointegrating relationship. 
4 Similar results are obtained when using data from the IRS market. 
5  This  is a realised average  period ensuing from the entire sample of observations. It must be 
interpreted with some caution since rebalancing, as shown below, depends upon the variability of 
forward rates.   14  
estimated for the US dollar-denominated options market. They estimate a much 
shorter rebalancing period of five weeks, becoming only two weeks towards the end 
of the nineties. This difference can be explained by either the existence of much 
higher transactions costs in the european market and/or by differences in risk 
aversion. By the latter, it is not meant that european dealers are less risk averse than 
their american counterparts but their risk exposure may be, in effect, relatively 
limited. We have already pointed out that market activity figures show a net demand 
for euro-denominated interest rate options of 25%, while the respective figure 
presented by Kambhu and Mosser for the US dollar-denominated market is double 
that (50%). The two markets are of a comparable size. 
The estimation results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. Equation (A) shows 
the relationship between the five-year spot rate (BOBL) and the three-to-five and 
five-to-ten year forward rates extracted from the government yield curve. The 
estimated coefficients  1 β  and  2 β  are statistically significant and have the appropriate 
signs. Overall, our results reveal that changes in forward rates do influence future 
spot rates. This influence, nevertheless, appears rather limited. The size of the 
estimated coefficients  1 β  and  2 β  shows that only some 7-8% of the change in 
forward rates is transmitted to the spot rate. Moreover, the model’s explanatory 
power (as captured by the
2 R ) is low and reveals that the variation in forward rates 
explains only some 4% of the variation in the spot rate. This holds true on average for 
the entire sample of observations. Below, we explore the issue further by considering 
the size of the feedback effect during periods of large sustained changes in the five-
year rate. The low explanatory power of the model also indicates that arbitrage 
opportunities between forward and spot rates are not systematically present. 
Consequently, the view of an efficient functioning of the market is reinforced. The 
results just described are similar to those of Kambhu and Mosser in the case of US 
dollar-denominated interest rate options market
6. 
Equation (B) in Table 5 uses data from the German IRS market. The results 
obtained are statistically significant but not as strong as the results in equation (A). In 
                                                           
6 According to Kambhu and Mosser , the variation in forward rates explains 4% of the variation in the 
spot rate while approximately 20% of the change in forward rates is transmitted to the spot rate.   15  
general, the data extracted from the government yield curve appear more suitable for 
explaining the relationship under investigation. 
Equation (C) shows the positive feedback effect on the BOBL yield from the 
forwards extracted from the IRS curve, while equation (D) shows the positive 
feedback effect on the five-year swap rate from the forwards extracted from the 
government yield curve. The statistical significance of the estimated coefficients in 
equation (D), compared to those in (C), is higher and the same holds true for the size 
of 
2 R . This finding indicates that, although the positive feedback is detected in both 
data sets, the direction of the spill over is from the market for government paper to 
the swaps market
7. 
Given the heterogeneity of government bond markets, the euro swap curve 
has emerged recently as the new benchmark for european fixed income markets. The 
introduction of the euro led to the creation of a large and liquid market in euro-
denominated swaps
8. In addition, the swap market presents significant advantages 
over the government paper market for hedging purposes
9. The detected direction of 
the spill over from the bond market to the swaps market is contradictory to this recent 
development (a development observed after the introduction of the euro) but can be 
possibly explained by the longer period covered by our sample (1993 – 2002). 
In order to examine further the detected positive feedback effect, we partition 
our sample into two sub-samples, one including only large changes in forward rates 
and the second consisting of small changes in forward rates
10. The relevant regression 
results appear in Table 6. The estimated coefficients  1 β  and  2 β  are statistically 
significant only in the case of the sample of large changes. Therefore, the feedback 
effect appears to be present only during periods of large changes in forward rates. In 
                                                           
7Contrary to what has prevailed during the earlier part of the 1990s, Kambhu and Mosser found that in 
the latter part of the decade the direction of “causality” for positive feedback effects is from the swaps 
market to the Treasury market. 
8 According to the BIS data, comparing activity in legacy currencies in 1998 with that in the euro in 
2001, there was an increase of 104%. 
9 Those advantages are: a) IRS match exactly the maturity of the forward transactions; b) the swap 
yield curve serves as a basis for pricing forward transactions more generally; and c) transaction costs 
are low due to the very good liquidity in the IRS market (especially when compared to the cash market 
for non-benchmark bonds). 
10 This was achieved by increasing a cutoff value for the change in both forward rates in 1 bp 
increments until the two, so created, sub-samples have roughly the same size. The two sub-samples 
reached roughly the same size for a cutoff value of 38 bp.   16  
the presence of transaction costs, dealers opt to adjust their hedge-related positions 
after forward rates have changed by more than certain amount
11. 
Finally, we estimate the relationship between the spot five-year rate and 
lagged forward rates in periods leading up to episodes of large changes in the five-
year rate. In other words, we investigate the size of the positive feedback effect in 
periods characterised by the building-up of strong expectations about an imminent 
significant change in the five-year yield
12. This is achieved by compiling a sub-
sample from our initial sample comprising observations (of the five-year spot rate and 
the related forward rates) for which the subsequent two-month change in the five-year 
rate lies within the largest 10% of rate changes. The relevant regression results appear 
in Table 7. They are remarkably different from the results obtained by using the full 
sample of observations. The size of the estimated coefficients  1 β  and  2 β  shows that 
20% of the change in forward rates is transmitted to the spot rate. Moreover, the 
model’s explanatory power increases considerably since the variation in forward rates 




7. Conclusions – Policy implications 
We have verified the presence of a positive feedback effect due to dynamic 
hedging of interest rate options positions on the medium-term segment of the yield 
curve. This positive feedback induces a kind of overshooting during displacements of 
the midpoint of the curve. The effect is produced because positions are adjusted 
mechanistically, independently of economic fundamentals. 
The effect is present during periods characterised by significant changes in 
interest rates (realised volatility). During those periods approximately 6% of the 
variation in the five-year yield is due to dynamic hedging of options positions (results 
                                                           
11 This asymmetry in behaviour leads in practice to a rebalancing period the length of which varies 
with the size of change in forward rates. 
12 The underlying assumption here is that market participants are not usually caught by surprise 
regarding those large changes which is the result of significant shifts in economic fundamentals and/or 
policy stance. Market participants constantly monitor, for example, the evolution of different economic 
indicators and the comments made by policy makers. 
13 Kambhu and Mosser report similar results, though slightly different in size. The variation in forward 
rates explains 40% of the variation in the spot rate while more than 70% of the change in forward rates 
is transmitted to the spot rate. 
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in Table 6). This is not large and, in this respect, the detected effect appears to be 
only of second-order. Economic fundamentals and policy still overwhelmingly 
determine the short-term dynamics of the yield curve. The size of the effect, however, 
becomes important during periods of significant expected volatility in rates. During 
those periods some 30% of the variation in the five-year yield is attributed to the 
activity of dynamic hedging of options positions (results in Table 7). 
The one-week change in the BOBL yield between 13/5 and 20/5/2003 was     
–13 basis points. On 20/5 there were strong expectations of an imminent significant 
reduction in interest rates
14. Therefore, according to our estimates, some 4 bp out of 
the total reduction in the BOBL yield can be attributed to the positive feedback effect, 
i.e. the weekly drop in the yield would be 9 bp without the feedback. Assuming that 
on 20/5 there were no expectations of significant changes in interest rates, the 
positive feedback effect would be 0.8 bp. 
Regarding risk management considerations, our results imply that there 
should be no problem for dealers to carry their hedge-related trades transacting at 
reasonable prices, when interest rate volatility is normal. In times, however, of large 
shifts in interest rates and furthermore during periods when expectations of 
significant changes are building up, dealers may find themselves exposed to far 
higher risks than they had anticipated. They may face prices at which it is too 
unfavourable to transact. In that case, the positive feedback effect due to dynamic 
hedging may be more disruptive since it amplifies market shocks. 
Market participants and policy makers closely monitor and interpret yield 
curve movements because the curve is believed to reflect expectations of future 
economic fundamentals as well as one component of the monetary transmission 
mechanism, that from short-term to long-term interest rates
15. According to our 
results, this information content of the yield curve is not significantly impaired under 
normal circumstances. Movements of the curve, however, may have to be interpreted 
more carefully when market shocks or significant policy changes occur (in terms of 
realised as well as expected volatility). Under these circumstances, changes in the 
                                                           
14 In fact, both the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve Board (FED) eventually 
reduced interest rates. The ECB on 5/6/03 by 50 basis points and the FED on 25/6/03 by 25 basis 
points. 
15 See, for instance, the ECB Monthly Bulletin (May 2000).   18  
curve may incorporate significant overshooting due to the positive feedback effect 
shown by our analysis.   19  
Appendix 
Estimation procedure and related econometric tests 
 
 
1. Preliminary tests 
The issue of non-stationarity has several important implications for 
econometric modelling. Depending on the degree of non-stationarity of the different 
variables involved, standard inference procedures may or may not apply. 
In order to test for the presence of a unit root, we applied the method of 
Dickey and Fuller (1981). Applying the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test in the 
data series, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the data is a unit root 
series. On the other hand, when the unit root tests are applied to the first differences, 
the I(1) null hypothesis is easily rejected (Table A1). Thus, our data appear to contain 
a single unit root  which cancels out at first differencing. 
This suggests that the variables above are best modelled as I(1) processes. 
Consequently, our empirical model needs to be specified in terms of first differences. 
 
 
2. Estimation procedure using German government bond yields 
While the variables under consideration are non-stationary, it is still possible 
to find one or more linear combinations of the series that are stationary. In this case, 
the series themselves are said to be cointegrated and the stationary linear 
combination(s) is (are) referred to as the cointegrating equations and represent a long-
run equilibrium relationship. In fact, cointegration exists if discrepancies from the 
presupposed relationship have bounded variability. Following a common shock, 
cointegrated series gradually converge to their long-run equilibrium relationships. 
As noted by Engle and Granger (1987), time-series regressions involving 
relationships between the changes in cointegrated variables should include a lagged 
cointegration term in order to control for correlation between the contemporaneous 
levels of the regressions variables that would otherwise interfere with the consistent 
estimation of the equation coefficients. The error correction term is dynamic in the 
sense that it involves lags of the dependent and explanatory variables. It thus captures   20  
short–run adjustments to past disequilibria and to contemporaneous changes in the 
explanatory variables so allowing equilibrium to be  achieved gradually. In particular, 
the size and the statistical significance of the error correction term measures the speed 
at which the dependent variable returns to its long–run equilibrium. 
 
2.1 VAR specification testing and tests for cointegration among the 
integrated variables. 
We apply the Johansen (1991) maximum likelihood procedure that tests for 
the significance of all the cointegrating vectors between the variables. 
The lag order of the VAR is often selected somewhat arbitrarily, with standard 
recommendations suggesting that we set it long enough to ensure that the residuals 
are white noise. However, if you chose it too large, the estimates become imprecise. 
Thus, four versions of the system are initially estimated involving four lags, six lags, 
eight lags and ten lags respectively. Two criteria (Akaike Information and Schwarz 
Baysian) and a likelihood ratio test are used to select the appropriate lag length. Both 
criteria and the LR test selects VAR(4). 
In order to evaluate the number of cointegrating vectors between the variables, 
the trace test is conducted. Depending on the number of endogenous variables (n), the 
Johansen procedure produces the maximum number of the cointegrating vectors, 
which is n-1. Test statistics reject the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors in 
favour of one cointegrating vector at the 5 per cent level of significance (Table A2). 
Thus, having determined that the variables under consideration are cointegrated, the 
vector error correction model can be applied. 
Applying the VEC methodology the resulting cointegrating equation is 
specified as follows: 
 Z  =  BOBLi -0.022 -3.006 5 , 3 GovF   + 1.942 10 , 5 GovF     (1A) 
             (0.522)    (0.520) 
The figures in parentheses are the standard errors. All the coefficients are 
significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed) and with the anticipated sign. 
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2.2 Regression results 
As already described, in order to determine the influence of the forward rates 
on the spot rate, we run several regressions in the form of (1) repeatedly for 
50 ,..., 4 , 3 , 2 = t  so as to figure out the effect of changes in forward rates ranging from 
a one-week change up to 49-week changes. Z(-1) is the error correction term from the 
cointegration relationship  in the level of rates as described earlier. Diagrams 3 and 4 
show the F-statistics for the joint distribution of  1 β  and  2 β  as well as the confidence 
bands for  1 β  and  2 β  estimates. The test statistics in these diagrams were computed 
with White Heteroscedastisticy Consistent Covariances. 
The regression results of the BOBL yield on forward rates from the German 
Government yield curve are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
3. Estimation procedure using rates from the swap curve 
We employ the same methodology regarding the VAR specification as in 2.1 
above, using rates from the IRS curve. Test statistics reject the null hypothesis of zero 
cointegrating vectors in favour of one cointegrating vector at the 5 per cent level of 
significance (Table A3). Thus, having determined that the variables under 
consideration are cointegrated, the vector error correction model can be applied. 
Applying the VEC methodology the resulting cointegrating equation is 
specified as follows: 
 
 Z  =  Y irs5 -0.033 -3.1164 5 , 3 irsF  +2.7607 10 , 5 irsF  
            (0.416)        (0.53) 
The figures in parentheses are the standard errors. All the coefficients are 
significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed) and have the anticipated sign. 
The regression results of the spot rate on the forward rates from the IRS curve are 
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4. Spill over effects between the German government bond and the 
German IRS markets.  
 
4.1 Regression of BOBL yield on forward rates from IRS curve 
The regression results of the BOBL yield on the forward rates from the IRS 
curve are shown in Table 5, equation (C). The test statistics were computed with 
White Heteroskedasticity Consistent Covariances. Test statistics reject the null 
hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors in favour of one cointegrating vector at the 5 
per cent level of significance (Table A4). Thus, having determined that the variables 
under consideration are cointegrated, the vector error correction model can be 
applied. 
Applying the VEC methodology the resulting cointegrating equation is 
specified as follows: 
  Z   =   BOBLi -3.0487 5 , 3 irsF  +2.727 10 , 5 irsF  -0.0316 
       (0.407)   (0.520) 
The figures in parentheses are the standard errors. All the coefficients are 
significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed) and have the anticipated sign. 
 
4.2 Regression of the spot 5Y rate from IRS on forward rates from the 
government yield curve. 
The regression results of the spot 5Y rate from IRS on forward rates from the 
government yield curve are shown in Table 5, equation (D). Test statistics reject the 
null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors in favour of one cointegrating vector at 
the 5 per cent level of significance (Table A5). Thus, having determined that the 
variables under consideration are cointegrated, the vector error correction model can 
be applied. 
Applying the VEC methodology, the resulting cointegrating equation is 
specified as follows: 
  Z   =   Y irs5  -2.863 5 , 3 GovF  +1.771 10 , 5 GovF  -0.00313 
(0.549)   (0.530) 
The figures in parentheses are the standard errors. All the coefficients are 
significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed) and with the anticipated sign.   23  
5. Regressions for periods of large and small changes in the forward 
rates. 
For the periods of large and small changes in the forward rates, the regression 
results are shown in Table 6. The error correction term Z has already been specified 
in (1A) above. 
 
 
6. Regressions for periods of large changes in the five-year rate. 
Regarding the sample of large changes in the spot 5Y rate, the regression 
results are shown in Table 7. The error correction term Z has been again specified in 
(1A) above. 
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 Diagram 1. Spot and forward rates from the German government yield curve 
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Diagram 3: Model’s statistical significance at various rebalancing periods. 
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TABLE 1: Global positions in OTC derivatives markets 
(Notional amounts, trillions of USD) 
 
Type   1995 1998  2001
FX derivatives  13.1 22.1  20.4
Options (FX)  2.4 5.04  2.8
Interest rate derivatives  26.6 48.1  75.8








TABLE 2: Global positions in the OTC interest rate derivatives markets 
(Nominal amounts, in trillions USD) 
 
By maturity  1995 1998 2001
Up to 1 year  11.7 20.2  29.2
Between 1 and 5 years  11.5 19.0  29.5








Table 3: Effect on the 5Y spot rate from a change in 3x5 and/or 5x10 forwards 
 
CAPS or FLOORS 
 
Change in forward 
3x5 5x10 
Increase  + - 
Decrease  - + 
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TABLE 4: Regression results 
 
 
Sample period 1993-2002 
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TABLE 5: Regression results 
 
Sample period 1994-2002 
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TABLE 6: Regressions with large and small changes in forward rates 
 
 Large  Changes 
 
bp F 38 5 , 3 ≥ ∆  or  bp F 38 10 , 5 ≥ ∆  
Small Changes 
 




























2 R   0.055 0.034 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.044 0.023 
Observations 259  253 
 
Note: Sample period 1993-2002. Spot and forward rates from German government yield curve. 







TABLE 7: Regression for periods of large changes in the five-year rate 
 
  Large leading two-month change 
 



















2 R   0.31 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.26 
Observations 49 
 
Note: The sample is the largest 10% of two-month changes in the BOBL yield 
in the period 1993-2002. Forward rates are also from German government 
yield curve. Standard error is in parenthesis. 
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5 , 3 GovF   10 , 5 GovF   Y irs5   5 , 3 irsF   10 , 5 irsF  
ADF-test 
statistic 
-2.007  -2.298 -1.940 -2.062 -2.327  -2.185 
First 
differences 
-9.081  -10.130 -11.459 -10.140 -11.683  -13.694 
Note: Tests were carried out with an intercept, trend and 4 lags. The 5% (1%) critical 
values is -3.4193 (-3.9778). The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected against the 
one-sided alternative if the t statistic is less than the critical value. In the above 
examples the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the levels of the 









Table A2. Johansen cointegration tests on rates from German Government Curve 
(Johansen test statistics) 
Sample: 1993 -2002 
Null  hypothesis: 
Cointegration 








R=0 37.11  29.68  35.65 
R 1 ≤  9.26  15.41  20.04 
R 2 ≤  2.51  3.76 6.65 
Note: Based on Johansen trace statistic. The test procedure consists of estimating a 
VAR with a linear combination of the n-1 variables. The test determined the number of 
cointegrating vectors together with the coefficient estimates of the cointegrating 
equations. The VAR employs 4 lags. The estimation procedure assumes linear trend in 
the data and an intercept but no trend in the cointegrating equation. Critical values are 
from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). 
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Table A3. Johansen cointegration tests on rates from the German IRS curve 
(Johansen test statistics) 
Sample 1994 – 2002 (Total No of observations 458) 
Null  hypothesis: 
Cointegration 








R=0 34.67  29.68  35.65 
R 1 ≤  4.47  15.41  20.04 
R 2 ≤  0.92  3.76 6.65 











Table A4. Johansen cointegration tests on rates from the German IRS curve 
(Johansen test statistics) 
Sample 1/6/1994 – 10/10/2002 (Total No of observations 457) 
Null  hypothesis: 
Cointegration 
rank  r 
 




R=0 36.31  29.68  35.65 
R 1 ≤  5.47  15.41  20.04 
R 2 ≤  0.68  3.76  6.65 
See note in Table A2 
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Table A5. Johansen cointegration tests on rates from the German IRS curve 
(Johansen test statistics) 
Sample 1/1/1994 – 10/11/2002 (Total No of observations 458) 
Null  hypothesis: 
Cointegration 
rank  r 
 




R=0 31.32  29.68  35.65 
R 1 ≤  5.12  15.41  20.04 
R 2 ≤  1.47  3.76  6.65 
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